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Sentences such as The author started the book are indeterminate because they
do not make explicit what the subject (the author) started doing with the object
(the book). In principle, indeterminate sentences allow for an infinite number of
interpretations. One theory, however, assumes that these sentences are resolved by
semantic coercion, a linguistic process that forces the noun book to be interpreted
as an activity (e.g., writing the book) or by a process that interpolates this activity
information in the resulting enriched semantic composition. An alternative theory,
pragmatic, assumes classical semantic composition, whereby meaning arises from
the denotation of words and how they are combined syntactically, with enrichment
obtained via pragmatic inferences beyond linguistic-semantic processes. Cognitive
neuroscience studies investigating the neuroanatomical and functional correlates of
indeterminate sentences have shown activations either at the ventromedial pre-frontal
cortex (vmPFC) or at the left inferior frontal gyrus (L-IFG). These studies have supported
the semantic coercion theory assuming that one of these regions is where enriched
semantic composition takes place. Employing functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), we found that indeterminate sentences activate bilaterally the superior temporal
gyrus (STG), the right inferior frontal gyrus (R-IFG), and the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), more so than control sentences (The author wrote the book). Activation of
indeterminate sentences exceeded that of anomalous sentences (. . .drank the book)
and engaged more left- and right-hemisphere areas than other sentence types. We
suggest that the widespread activations for indeterminate sentences represent the
deployment of pragmatic-inferential processes, which seek to enrich sentence content
without necessarily resorting to semantic coercion.
Keywords: indeterminate sentences, semantic coercion, compositionality, pragmatics, fMRI, inferior frontal
gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex
INTRODUCTION
A hallmark of linguistic communication is that sentences are often indeterminate: their
intended messages cannot be obtained by simply resorting to what they explicitly say, that is,
to the meaning of their constituent words and how those meanings combine. For example,
a sentence such as (1a) can be taken to express the idea that John wants to drink or to buy
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a beer, just like (1b) can be taken to express that Mary began
reading or writing the book.
(1) a. John wants a beer;
b. Mary began the book.
In fact, there are many possible interpretations for sentences (1a)
and (1b) beyond what they say. What is not clear is the source
of information that is supposed to enrich the content of these
sentences beyond what their constituent words and their modes
of combination provide. More specifically, how doesMary began
the book come to be understood as something like Mary began
to read the book? And, more pertinent to our present goals, what
are the neurological resources deployed in the comprehension of
these sentences?
Thus far, there have been two prevalent theoretical
views on how indeterminate sentences such as (1a) and
(1b) are understood. The coercion theory (e.g., Pustejovsky,
1995; Jackendoff, 1997) assumes that semantic information
represented within the complement noun book (e.g., that books
are read) contributes content to the sentence and, thus, licenses
an enriched semantic representation, such asMary began reading
the book. A related view assumes that a semantic operation—type
shifting or type coercion—is responsible for changing the reading
of the object noun from that of an entity (book) into that of an
activity (thus denoting something done with the book—such
as reading the book)1. An alternative to both versions of the
coercion theory is one which we call pragmatic (de Almeida
and Dwivedi, 2008; de Almeida and Riven, 2012; see also Fodor
and Lepore, 2002). This theory assumes that the way in which a
sentence such as (1b) is understood arises from the application
of general pragmatic principles, where the constituents and the
structure of the sentence are initially taken at face value (see also
Dölling, 2014).
With regards to the neurological correlates of indeterminate
sentence comprehension, different studies point to the
engagement of different neuroanatomical regions as the
main source of indeterminacy resolution. For instance,
magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies suggest that the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is the main site
of indeterminacy resolution—in fact, the site of semantic
coercion (Pylkkänen and McElree, 2007; Pylkkänen et al.,
2009). The only study employing functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI; Husband et al., 2011), however, found no
evidence for the engagement of the vmPFC, suggesting
instead that the left inferior frontal gyrus (L-IFG; BA 45)
is the site of coercion processes. The present study also
employed fMRI to further investigate the neurological
correlates of indeterminacy resolution. What differentiates
1A thorough review of the numerous theoretical positions on how semantic
coercion, type coercion, or type shifting work is beyond the scope of the
present article (see e.g., Partee, 1986; Briscoe et al., 1990; Goddard and Jayez,
1993; Pustejovsky, 1995; Jackendoff, 1997; for a review see also de Swart,
2011). Also, rather than following common practice and calling sentences
such as those in (1) ‘‘coerced’’—which is linked to one hypothesis about how
they are semantically represented—we refer to them as indeterminate because
there is uncertainty with regards to the state of affairs that the sentences
denote, although truth-value judgments can be made (Gillon, 2004).
our study from previous ones is that we were also interested in
understanding whether indeterminate sentences are resolved
by coercion or whether they involve pragmatic processes.
To this end, we employed a larger number of experimental
control conditions and a whole-brain analysis in order
to obtain a broader picture of the neuroanatomical map
of indeterminate sentences, in contrast to other sentence
types.
While our main goal is to establish the neurological
resources deployed in the resolution of indeterminate sentences,
our empirical investigation also aims to contribute to a
better understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of
indeterminacy—whether sentences are resolved by semantic
coercion or pragmatic processes. We thus begin by discussing
what is at stake in the investigation of indeterminate sentence
comprehension: how the brain might compose meanings of
sentences.
Two Views on Semantic Composition
The process of understanding a sentence requires at a minimum
that the meaning of its constituent words or morphemes be
put together according to its structure—what is known as
compositionality or semantic composition (for a review see e.g.,
Partee, 1984; Fodor and Lepore, 2002; Szabó, 2012). The two
views on indeterminate sentence resolution briefly presented
above differ mainly with regards to what they take to be the
nature of semantic composition processes.
The coercion theory by and large adopts a view known
as enriched compositionality (Pustejovsky, 1995; Jackendoff,
1997). With regards to sentences such as those in (1), the
assumption is that indeterminacy arises from a mismatch
between the requirements of the verb and the semantic
nature of its internal argument. A verb such as begin, for
instance, arguably requires an activity complement such as
a gerundial phrase (reading the book), an infinitival phrase
(to read the book), or even a noun complement denoting
an activity (e.g., the lecture). But when only a noun phrase
(NP) complement denoting an entity (the book) appears, the
mismatch is assumed to be resolved by coercion (Pustejovsky,
1995). Thus, although activities such as drinking or reading
are not specified overtly in (1a) and (1b), forms such as
want x or begin x can be taken to denote something like
want/begin to do with x what is typically done with x,
with interpolation of a default activity into the resulting
composition. Alternatively, the process of coercion relies
simply on type-shifting; that is, modifying the interpretation
of the entity (e.g., book) into that of an activity in order
to conform with the verb requirements (akin to Partee,
1986). Although there are numerous variations on these
approaches to coercion processes (e.g., Traxler et al., 2005;
Pylkkänen, 2008)—and in particular whether or not interpolation
occurs—what is relevant for the present purposes is the
postulation that the resolution of indeterminacy is driven
primarily by linguistic-internal mechanisms. And common to all
theories of coercion is the proposal that the operation—triggered
by a mismatch between verb and complement—yields an
enriched composition.
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In contrast, the pragmatic-inferential theory assumes that the
initial representation of a sentence is only a function of the
meaning of its constituent words and how they are structured
together—in syntax or logical form—a position commonly
referred to as classical compositionality (Fodor and Lepore, 2002).
According to this view, enriched interpretations of sentences
such as (1b) are possible only because the linguistic form leaves
informational ‘‘gaps’’ which serve as triggers for pragmatic
inferences (Fodor and Lepore, 2002; de Almeida and Dwivedi,
2008; de Almeida and Lepore, in press). Although this view
does not make particular claims about how pragmatic inferences
are carried out (for alternatives see e.g., Carston, 2002; Hobbs,
2004), the key idea is that any conceptual enrichment that might
occur as a function of semantic indeterminacy is resolved by
appealing not to a coercion operation, but to pragmatics (see also
Dölling, 2014). Essentially, pragmatic inferences are not taken
to be constitutive of the meaning of the sentence but a natural
consequence of it: they are inferences one draws upon hearing a
sentence that leaves information to be desired or implicated (see
Grice, 1989).
In summary, while what we called coercion theory
takes type-shifting and interpolation to be key elements of
enrichment—with varying degrees of contribution from other
knowledge systems (see e.g., Traxler et al., 2005)—what we called
the pragmatic theory is committed to classical compositionality
at the linguistic level and defers enrichment to pragmatic
inferences on the assumption that the linguistic system is
uninformed about possible enriching events.
Empirical Studies
There have been numerous behavioral studies investigating
how indeterminate sentences might be processed. These have
involved experimental paradigms such as self-paced reading
(McElree et al., 2001; de Almeida, 2004; Leitão et al., 2010) and
eye-tracking (Traxler et al., 2002, 2005; Pickering et al., 2005;
McElree et al., 2006; Katsika et al., 2012). The majority of these
studies have demonstrated that there are ‘‘costs’’ associated with
processing indeterminate sentences such as (2a) compared to
preferred sentences (2b) at the noun (memo) and for post-noun
positions (e.g., before). These results have been taken as evidence
of semantic coercion assuming that the extra time required
to read the indeterminate sentence is due to the process of
interpolation of semantic information, yielding an interpretation
such as (2d).
(2) a. The secretary began the memo before the annual sales
conference (indeterminate);
b. The secretary typed the memo before the annual sales
conference (preferred);
c. The secretary read the memo before the annual sales
conference (non-preferred);
d. The secretary began [typing] the memo before the annual
sales conference.
While these studies have been useful in calling attention to
the phenomenon, their results have been conflicting (see e.g.,
de Almeida, 2004; Pickering et al., 2005) and they are compatible
with alternative explanations (e.g., de Almeida and Dwivedi,
2008).
Perhaps more important for our current purposes are
studies employing cognitive neuroscience methods, which can
complement behavioral studies while also potentially helping us
dissociate the very source of behavioral differences.Most relevant
to the present study were the studies by Pylkkänen and McElree
(2007), using MEG, and by Husband et al. (2011), using fMRI,
both of which aimed to identify the neural networks implicated
in the resolution of indeterminacy, assuming that it necessarily
involves coercion2.
In theirMEG study, Pylkkänen andMcElree (2007) compared
indeterminate sentences such as (3a) to anomalous sentences
such as (3b) and preferred controls such as (3c) in a task that
required participants to judge the acceptability of these sentences.
(3) a. The journalist began the article after his coffee break
(indeterminate);
b. The journalist astonished the article after his coffee break
(anomalous);
c. The journalist wrote the article after his coffee break
(preferred).
They found that, relative to the other conditions, indeterminate
sentences produced a unique response in what they called the
anterior midline field (AMF), hypothesized to be at the vmPFC.
This response occurred at 350–500 ms after the presentation of
the NP the article. The effect was flanked by bilateral temporal
activation, with an outgoing field to the right temporal region
and an entering field from the left temporal region. Given this
differential activation of indeterminate sentences, the authors
suggested that the AMF, particularly the vmPFC, is the locus of
enriched composition.
Most recently, Husband et al. (2011) conducted an
fMRI study with sentences modified from Pylkkänen
and McElree (2007), with the addition of a syntactically
anomalous condition such as The novelist write the book
before the break. Similar to Pylkkänen and McElree (2007)
method, participants were asked to judge the acceptability
of sentences during scanning. They found differential
activations between indeterminate and control sentences
in three main areas. In two of these areas—left middle-
temporal gyrus (L-MTG) and left inferior parietal lobe
(L-IPL)—they found deactivations. Their main finding
was that indeterminate sentences significantly activated
the L-IFG (BA 45) relative to controls, leading the
authors to conclude that this region represents the locus
2We restrict our review to studies that have employed the same kinds of
sentences as ours. Although other cognitive neuroscience studies were also
concerned with the general phenomenon of coercion, they either employed
other sentence types—which might involve different linguistic processes
(e.g., Pylkkänen et al., 2009)—or employed techniques such as ERP (Baggio
et al., 2010; Kuperberg et al., 2010) which does not allow for similar
neuroanatomical predictions as ours (for a study with aphasics, see also
Piñango and Zurif, 2001). ERP studies, in particular, have obtained similar
results as the behavioral studies they followed, with different wave patterns
for indeterminate sentences compared to control sentences. We address ERP
effects in the ‘‘General Discussion’’ Section, below.
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of coercion. No differential activation was found in the
vmPFC, contra Pylkkänen and McElree’s (2007) AMF
result.
Husband et al. (2011) explained their failure to replicate
Pylkkänen and McElree’s (2007) findings in terms of technical
disparities. Whereas MEG is sensitive to the temporal
components of processing, fMRI is better suited to localization
mapping. In addition, the vmPFC activations measured by fMRI
are prone to susceptibility artifacts (Ojemann et al., 1997), which
may have attenuated the contrast between indeterminate and
control sentences. Thus, each study has provided unique insights
concerning the neural substrates of indeterminate sentence
processing. The MEG results suggest that interpretation engages
left-temporal, right-temporal and medial-frontal areas, and that
the time course of processing progresses from left to right to
medial regions (Pylkkänen and McElree, 2007). The fMRI data
suggest that the L-IFG emerges as a critical region of processing,
rather than the vmPFC.
Although we regard these data as informative, the
neurological underpinnings and, more importantly, the
source of indeterminacy resolution remain unresolved. One
possible explanation for the difference between the MEG and
fMRI results is that the proposed AMF activation represents
core processes occurring in medial frontal regions other
than the vmPFC. If this is indeed the case, additional fMRI
data are needed to explore these regions in greater detail. In
addition, although Pylkkänen and McElree (2007) describe
significant processes occurring in right temporal areas, the
role of the right hemisphere (RH) during indeterminate
sentence processing has yet to be further investigated. The
only fMRI study on indeterminate sentence processing to
date (Husband et al., 2011) has found effects primarily in
the L-IFG, and has restricted the region of interest (ROI)
analyses to the vmPFC and traditional language regions in
the left hemisphere (LH; e.g., L-IFG). Moreover, neither of
the neuroscience studies we discussed above was designed
specifically to contrast coercion with pragmatic accounts of
indeterminacy resolution: rather they aimed to find the sources
of coercion, under the assumption that any neural activation
differences between indeterminate sentences and controls
would constitute evidence for coercion. Yet indeterminate
sentences differ from control, fully determinate sentences
in many respects, including the syntactic structure of their
verb phrases (see de Almeida and Dwivedi, 2008) which
might account for their processing differences. Moreover,
an exploration of other brain regions—beyond the vmPFC
and L-IFG—during indeterminate sentence comprehension
is important to investigate alternative hypotheses to coercion,
in particular the hypothesis that indeterminate sentences are
resolved pragmatically.
The Present Study
The primary goal of the present fMRI study was to determine
the brain areas recruited in attempting to resolve indeterminate
sentences. We reasoned that the neuroanatomical signature of
indeterminate sentences would be fundamentally different
from that of determinate sentences on the assumption
that indeterminate sentences might trigger the search for
implicatures akin to what is triggered when sentences flout
a conversational maxim (Grice, 1989)—when, for instance,
sentences are less informative than they need to be or
are purposefully ambiguous. Thus, our first goal was to
obtain an activation map for indeterminate sentences and
various controls—ranging from fully determinate sentences
to syntactic and semantic anomalies. We also aimed to
examine the involvement of medial and right-hemispheric
brain regions, which have been linked to different types of
pragmatic processes, in addition to examining the involvement
of traditional language areas. We regard this broader approach
as essential for understanding the effects found in the majority
of behavioral studies, with important implications for the
functional and neurological bases of sentence comprehension
more generally. In addition, we expected that such data would
complement the time-course and localization effects observed
with MEG (Pylkkänen and McElree, 2007), thus providing
converging evidence on the nature of indeterminate sentence
processing.
Although our main hypotheses are not tied to specific
neuroanatomical regions—for we aim to find differences in
the neuronal correlates between indeterminate and other types
of sentences—we will discuss rather briefly the literature on
the neuroanatomy of language processing and how it helps us
lay out our hypotheses. Numerous reviews and meta-analytic
studies have shown that large neuroanatomical regions beyond
the classical linguistic areas (e.g., Broca’s and Wernicke’s) are
involved in linguistic processes serving comprehension and
production (e.g., Bookheimer, 2002; Friederici, 2002, 2011;
Gernsbacher and Kaschak, 2003; Indefrey and Cutler, 2004;
Stowe et al., 2005; Hickock and Poeppel, 2007; Meyer, 2009;
Binder et al., 2011). Several studies manipulating sentence
complexity emphasize the role of the L-IFG (BA 44/45) in
syntactic structuring and syntactic memory (e.g., Stromswold
et al., 1996; Kang et al., 1999; Ni et al., 2000; Friederici et al.,
2003; Fiebach et al., 2005; Makuuchi et al., 2009; Friederici,
2011). Imaging studies on semantic aspects of word and
sentence comprehension have also pointed to the dominant role
of the LH, in particular the superior temporal gyrus (STG)
and the MTG (e.g., Binder et al., 1997, 2009; Bookheimer,
2002; Friederici et al., 2003; Damasio et al., 2004; Berwick
et al., 2013). Sub-regions in booth L-IFG and STG/MTG
and their interconnecting dorsal and ventral pathways are
seen as constituting a default language network for the vast
majority of right-handed speakers (for review see Friederici,
2011).
While linguistic processes involved in language
comprehension appear to rely on the LH default language
network, there are several issues with how these processes
map onto higher mechanisms of language interpretation. For
instance, the neuroanatomical resources involved in pragmatic
processes are less than clear. Studies with RH-damaged
patients have shown diminished comprehension of implicit
requests, irony, and metaphors (e.g., Champagne-Lavau
and Joanette, 2009). Although many RH-damaged patients
show generally spared syntactic and lexical-semantic abilities
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(e.g., Dronkers et al., 2004), they also show a marked difficulty
with implicit statements violating the maxim of quantity (make
your contribution as informative as required for the purposes
of the exchange; Grice, 1989) compared to statements that
make explicit assertions (Champagne et al., 2003). Moreover,
RH-damaged patients have difficulty drawing inferences
from connected sentences while having preserved ability
to understand individual sentences (Brownell et al., 1986;
for review see also Joanette et al., 2008). These results from
patient studies are compatible with several neuroimaging
experiments investigating discourse comprehension, which
have found activation in large RH and frontal areas (for
review see Gernsbacher and Kaschak, 2003). It is important to
point out that discourse comprehension processes require the
integration of diverse sources of information beyond sentence
meaning and thus might engage areas that underlie inferential
processing. For instance, studies have shown significant RH
activation when subjects have to make inferences about
implied (vs. explicit) events (Virtue et al., 2006), when they
have to generate ‘‘unusual relationships’’ between verbs and
nouns (e.g., producing throw for the noun dish; Seger et al.,
2000), and when they have to interpret stories (Binder et al.,
2011).
While hemispheric asymmetry in language processing is
clear, many have questioned the so-called ‘‘right-hemisphere
hypothesis’’, i.e., the hypothesis that the RH is primarily
involved in high-level, pragmatic processes (for a review see
e.g., Stemmer, 2016). A version of this hypothesis, however,
calls not for greater involvement of RH compared to LH,
but for different roles for both hemispheres—with the LH
more involved in fine-grained, literal interpretations, and the
RH involved in more ‘‘coarse’’ and figurative interpretations
(Jung-Beeman, 2005). Consistent with this hypothesis, Schmidt
and Seger (2009) found that the right insula and the right
inferior frontal gyrus (R-IFG) are significantly activated for
metaphors compared to literal sentences. Similar findings
were obtained by Bambini et al. (2011)—with overall greater
bilateral activation of IFG, the insula, and the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) for metaphors compared to literal expressions.
Bambini et al. (2011) also found greater involvement of right
superior temporal sulcus (STS) and middle FG in metaphor
processing, suggesting that quintessential pragmatic processes
engage different RH neural substrates—or engage them to a
larger extent—when compared to literal language (see also
Bottini et al., 1994; Kacinik and Chiarello, 2007)3. We see a
similar pattern even in studies showing LH-dominance in the
comprehension of metonymy (Rapp et al., 2011): the R-IFG
shows significant activation for metonymic (Hitchcock is worth
watching) expressions beyond what is required to activate
literal expressions (Hitchcock is dead). Other forms of figurative
language processing—such as irony and sarcasm—also suggest
the activation of bilateral networks, with significant RH clusters
3It should be noted that some studies have shown equal involvement of
both hemispheres in metaphor comprehension (Rapp et al., 2007; Stringaris
et al., 2007), perhaps reflecting parallel or competing literal and metaphorical
interpretations.
compared to literal controls (for a review see Bohrn et al.,
2012).
Results from these studies with figurative language, which
arguably require inferences or the search for what is implicated,
are compatible with those that employed semantically or
pragmatically odd sentences, which also involve reinterpretation
or the detection of a mismatch in semantic composition (e.g.,
Ni et al., 2000; Friederici et al., 2003). These latter studies show
strong bilateral activation of both STG and insula, suggesting
that processes beyond simple LH-driven semantic composition
might be recruited for the interpretation of anomalous sentences.
In fact, it has been suggested that semantic composition proper
(what we refer to as classical compositionality) involves left
temporal structures, in particular the anterior temporal lobe
(ATL; see Vandenberghe et al., 2002; Hickock and Poeppel,
2007; Lau et al., 2008). Collectively, these studies suggest that
LH and RH structures are involved in pragmatic enrichment,
above and beyond what is required to compose canonical
sentences.
The picture that emerges from the literature on neurological
implementation of linguistic processes allows us to hypothesize
that regions engaged in pragmatic and high-level cognitive
processes would be more involved in the comprehension of
indeterminate sentences (e.g., The author started the book)
above and beyond their engagement in the comprehension
of preferred sentences (e.g., The author wrote the book).
More specifically, we predicted that, if pragmatic processes
are called for to enrich indeterminate sentences, this should
engender greater activation of bilateral temporal and frontal
areas (compatible with the vmPFC/AMF effects found by
Pylkkänen and McElree, 2007), beyond the engagement of
these areas in preferred sentences. Conversely, if the resolution
of indeterminacy relies primarily on semantic coercion, we
should not expect to see comparatively greater involvement
of bilateral temporal and frontal regions during online
comprehension. We should rather expect greater involvement
of the left anterior temporal cortex (AT)—the STG, and the
MTG—traditionally associated with lexical representations and
possibly semantic composition (Vandenberghe et al., 2002;
Lau et al., 2008). Moreover, what the study by Husband
et al. (2011) has suggested is that the L-IFG should play a
significant role in indeterminacy resolution for it is at this
site where the alleged mismatch detection and repair take
place.
We should note that these hypotheses can only be laid down
in broad strokes, for we cannot distinguish between sources
of indeterminacy resolution without a clear understanding of
what types of computations the neuronal circuits perform.
Moreover, there are numerous potential neurological sources
for semantic composition—at least the vmPFC, the L-IFG, and
the AT—and it is possible that these areas make different
contributions to the process. But it is also possible that
the relative involvement of all these areas might signal
fundamentally different types of compositional processes—say,
processes ranging from lexical retrieval to structure building
and interpretation. In the present study, we restrict our
hypothesis to investigating specifically the composition (and
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possible enrichment) of indeterminate sentences. With these
caveats in mind, we take the neuronal signature of the
indeterminate sentence resolution to suggest what types of
information are recruited; currently, the alternatives are:
(a) purely linguistic, coercive operations restricted to the
vmPFC or the L-IFG; and (b) pragmatic-inferential processes
of enrichment, with the engagement of diverse brain areas
bilaterally.
In addition to examining the networks activated by
indeterminate sentences relative to preferred controls, we
sought to inform the pragmatic hypothesis by observing how
indeterminate sentences pattern relative to anomalous sentences,
such as The author drank the book. Such sentences violate
beliefs about real-world situations, and therefore impose special
demands on pragmatic processes—i.e, possibly by resorting
to a figurative interpretation4. Accordingly, we predicted that
insofar as indeterminate sentences impose analogous demands
for pragmatic processes, they should pattern together with such
anomalous sentences, particularly in the RH. This hypothesis
is based on similar cases of violations, such as The woman
ironed a kiss, which engage the RH significantly more than
controls (Kuperberg et al., 2000). Finally, we employed three
additional conditions: (1) non-preferred sentences such as The
author read the book; (2) full-VP sentences that included
the indeterminate verb and the preferred verb, as in The
author started writing the book; and (3) syntactically anomalous
sentences, such as The author yawned the book. Each of these
conditions contrasts with indeterminate sentences in unique
ways, allowing us to explore several secondary hypotheses. In
the following sections, we describe each of these sentences
in more detail and outline how they are involved in our
analyses.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Norming Study
Our norming study was framed by three main goals. First, we
wanted to gather acceptability rating data for the 648 sentences
employed in the fMRI experiment to ensure that our canonical
sentences would be rated within the normal range in contrast
with the anomalous conditions. Our second goal was to
obtain RT data for each sentence, segment by segment, to
allow us to contrast our materials with those employed in
the psycholinguistics literature. And our third goal was to
obtain a behavioral complement to our fMRI experiment.
The latter was designed to elicit natural language processing
without the complication of a secondary task, be it psychomotor
(e.g., button-pressing in self-paced reading) or cognitive
(grammaticality ratings). Sentence rating tasks in particular may
4We refer to these sentences as ‘‘pragmatically anomalous’’ because, although
they contain what are regarded as semantic (e.g., selectional restrictions)
violations, they might be interpretable by appealing to pragmatics. As Grice
(1989) puts it, a speaker can blatantly violate a conversational maxim—such
as to express an obvious falsity—in order to generate implicatures in the
mind of the hearer. Akin to common metaphors (e.g.,My lawyer is a shark),
semantic ill-formedness might be used to trigger abductive processes of
interpretation.
be problematic because they require participants to engage
in a metalinguistic mode of processing, thus confounding the
signal of online comprehension processes. To date, both the
MEG (Pylkkänen and McElree, 2007) and fMRI (Husband
et al., 2011) studies of indeterminate sentences have employed
grammaticality judgment tasks, leaving open the possibility
that the activation that indeterminate sentences elicited may
be related to metalinguistic processing. We therefore chose
to obtain behavioral data (ratings, RTs) separately in order
to diminish the impact of offline judgments on our fMRI
data.
Materials
The experimental sentences were created by first asking a
group of 60 students to fill in the blanks of frames such as
The ___ started the___ (for the indeterminate condition) and
The___started___ing the____ (for the preferred and full-VP
conditions). We then selected the most frequently used
agent/main-verb/object combination to construct a stimulus
set consisting of 108 sentence frames (e.g., The author. . .the
book) that differed across six verb conditions (see Table 1):
(1) Preferred; (2) Non-preferred; (3) Full-VP; (4) Indeterminate;
(5) Syntactically anomalous; and (6) Pragmatically anomalous.
Each of these conditions provided unique opportunities to
investigate the nature of indeterminate sentence processing.
The first three conditions represented canonical alternatives to
the indeterminate sentence. The preferred sentences included
verbs that were judged (see below) to best fit with an entity
NP complement (wrote); the non-preferred sentences included
verbs that were judged plausible but less preferred (read);
and the full-VP condition included both the indeterminate
verb and an activity complement (started writing). The last
two conditions provided anomalous contrasts for indeterminate
sentences, one introducing a syntactic/semantic violation,
namely, an intransitive verb (yawned), and the other introducing
a semantic/pragmatic violation (drank), both followed by the
same complement employed in the other conditions (the book).
The 108 sentence frames thus appeared in six conditions, making
a total of 648 sentence tokens. These were divided into six lists,
with 18 tokens of each condition in each list. In addition, a
set of 62 filler sentences was added to each list, for a total of
170 sentences per list.
Ratings
A group of 89 students who did not participate in the other
tasks was asked to judge the acceptability of the sentences on
a 5-point scale. They all gave written informed consent and
participated for course credit as part of the Concordia Psychology
Participant Pool. Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics for
the six sentence conditions by item. Results from a series of
pairwise t-tests indicate that compared to preferred sentences,
all other non-anomalous conditions were judged less acceptable
(Indeterminate: MD1 = −1.23, t1(88) = −24.72, p < 0.0045;
5This alpha level represents the adjusted threshold of statistical significance
for pairwise contrasts that yield a 0.05 family-wise type I error rate, following
the guidelines outlined in Kline (2004).
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TABLE 1 | Acceptability data (by items) for sentences used in the fMRI experiment.
Sentence type Sample df M SD SD pooleda da
Preferred The author wrote the book 107 4.76 0.33 – –
Full-VP The author started writing the book 107 4.54 0.46 0.63 0.35
Non-preferred The author read the book 107 4.44 0.59 0.68 0.48
Indeterminate The author started the book 107 3.54 1.06 0.84 1.46
Syntactically anomalous The author yawned the book 107 1.23 0.27 0.55 6.42
Pragmatically anomalous The author drank the book 107 1.46 0.49 0.64 5.15
aThe preferred sentence type was used to calculate SD pooled and d values for the subsequent conditions.
MD2 = −1.22, t2(107) = −11.33, p < 0.004; Non-preferred:
MD1 = −0.32, t1(88) = −8.11, p < 0.004; MD2 = −0.33,
t2(107) = −5.54, p < 0.004; and full-VP: MD1 = −0.22,
t1(88) = −7.18, p < 0.004; MD2 = −0.22, t2(107) = −5.03,
p< 0.004).
In order to evaluate the degree to which each condition
departed from the canonical preferred condition, we calculated
mean-difference effect sizes (d). Although indeterminate
sentences deviate from preferred sentences (d = 1.46), this
difference did not reach the magnitude observed in the two
anomalous conditions (d> 5.15). As can be seen in Table 1, even
non-preferred and full-VP sentences deviate from the preferred
condition, although none of these conditions constitute syntactic
or semantic violations. These data suggest that, although
indeterminate sentences are judged less canonical than preferred
and non-preferred sentences, similar to other studies (e.g.,
Husband et al., 2011), they are within the range of acceptable
sentences.
Reading Time
Another group of 83 participants, all of whom gave informed
consent, completed a word-by-word self-paced reading task. The
six sentence conditions and a set of 65 filler sentences were
presented in random order. Among the fillers, 25 sentences were
followed by Yes/No questions to ensure that the participants
remained attentive throughout the task.
Reading time data for all six conditions are summarized
in Table 2. Note that raw data were normalized by removing
outliers with values corresponding to ±2 standard deviations
from the mean of each condition (3.5% below and 7.1%
above). We conducted a set of one-way ANOVAs and
pairwise contrasts, comparing preferred, non-preferred and
indeterminate sentences, at the verb, determiner and noun
TABLE 2 | Mean reading times (and standard deviations) for the six
sentence types obtained in the norming task.
Verb type Sentence position
Verb Determiner Noun
the book
Preferred (wrote) 355 (86) 333 (66) 454 (186)
Non-preferred (read) 359 (87) 336 (70) 470 (192)
Indeterminate (started) 365 (95) 342 (68) 480 (192)
Full VP (started writing) 377 (95) 348 (65) 476 (227)
Syntactically anomalous (yawned) 360 (96) 365 (99) 515 (229)
Pragmatically anomalous (drank) 365 (99) 347 (68) 492 (227)
positions. We restricted our principal analysis to these three
conditions in order to ease comparison with psycholinguistic
studies reviewed above. Given these multiple comparisons, we
adjusted our threshold of significance for each contrast to 0.004.
Verb
At the verb position, there was no difference between sentences in
the participants analysis, F1(5,410) = 1.05, p = 0.22,MSE = 1821.43,
although in the items analysis there was a significant effect,
F2(5,535) = 2.41, p = 0.045,MSE = 2744.80. The sentence condition
accounted for only 2% of the variation in verb reading times,
thus, we do not consider the effect to be substantively significant.
Determiner
At the determiner position, both participants and items analyses
revealed statistically significant main effects, F1(5,410) = 10.42,
p < 0.001, MSE = 1862.24, partial-η21 = 0.11; F2(5,535) = 6.83,
p < 0.001, MSE = 1783.45, partial-η22 = 0.06. Pairwise
comparisons revealed that reading times for the indeterminate
condition were significantly longer than for the preferred
condition (MD = 9.40 ms) at the conventional threshold in the
participants analysis, t1(82) = 2.70, p = 0.008, but not in the items
analysis, t2(107) = 1.88, p = 0.063.
Noun
There was also a main effect of sentence at the noun position,
F1(5,410) = 4.31, p < 0.01, MSE = 13884.62, partial-η21 = 0.05;
F2(5,535) = 3.56, p < 0.05, MSE = 43823.33, partial-η22 = 0.03.
Pairwise comparisons showed that, while reading times for the
indeterminate sentence exceeded that of the preferred sentence
(MD = 25.61 ms), this difference did not surpass the adjusted
threshold of significance. Nevertheless, the comparison was
significant at the conventional alpha level for the items analysis,
t2(107) = 2.64, p = 0.009, but not the participants analysis,
t1(82) = 1.73, p = 0.087.
These RT data are largely in keeping with effects observed
in the psycholinguistics literature, which typically demonstrates
that indeterminate sentences take longer to process post-verbally
than preferred sentences (e.g., McElree et al., 2001), although not
consistently so (de Almeida, 2004; Pickering et al., 2005; Leitão
et al., 2010).
In addition to replicating the RT effects found in other
behavioral studies, we conducted additional analyses to
further characterize our materials and guide hypotheses.
Table 3 summarizes the results of dependent-samples t-tests
comparing reading times of indeterminate sentences to all
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TABLE 3 | Pairwise analyses at the noun region (e.g., book), subtracting indeterminate sentences from all other conditions in the self-paced reading
norming task.
Sentence type MD (ms) By participants By items
Preferred −25.61 t(82) = −1.73, p = 0.087 t(107) = −2.64, p = 0.009
Non-preferred −10.16 t(82) = −1.20, p = 0.233 t(107) = −0.46, p = 0.649
Full-VP −4.27 t(82) = −0.30, p = 0.765 t(107) = −0.64, p = 0.525
Syntactically anomalous 34.87 t(82) = 2.76, p = 0.007 t(107) = 3.09, p = 0.003
Pragmatically anomalous 12.01 t(82) = 1.23, p = 0.222 t(107) = 1.58, p = 0.117
other conditions at the noun region (e.g., book)—i.e., the initial
locus of indeterminate processing difficulty. These comparisons
show that, with the exception of the preferred contrast,
indeterminate sentences are not statistically costly relative
to any other condition, including non-preferred and full-VP
sentences. Moreover, indeterminate sentences were found to
be processed more easily than both anomalous conditions, but
only the contrast with syntactic anomalies achieved statistical
significance.
These results converge with our ratings data, which showed a
continuum of acceptability judgments from preferred sentences
(most felicitous) to syntactically anomalous sentences (least
felicitous), and that indeterminate sentences lie closer to the
felicitous end of this spectrum. Having collected both off-line
and on-line response measures for our materials, we set out
to conduct an fMRI experiment requiring participants to
passively read the stimuli, thus allowing us to track language
comprehension processes without the potential contaminations
of an extraneous task.
The fMRI Experiment
As we have described above, our principal hypotheses concern
patterns of activation for indeterminate sentences compared
with preferred sentences and pragmatic violations. But we have
also included several conditions that would allow us to explore
secondary hypotheses regarding the nature of indeterminate
sentence processing. We now elaborate on our main hypotheses
and the contrasts with each condition.
Hypotheses
Indeterminate sentences
We have designed the present experiment aiming to understand
the pattern of activation for indeterminate sentences and
thus gain insights into the nature of the neurocognitive
resources employed in the resolution of indeterminacy. Given
the inconsistent neuroanatomical correlates found in the two
studies employing fMRI and MEG, we sought out first to
establish the map of indeterminacy resolution. In addition
we aimed to gather support for either the coercion or the
pragmatic theory. Support for the coercion theory would be
rather restricted to greater linguistic operations either at the
L-IFG (Husband et al., 2011) or at the vmPFC (Pylkkänen and
McElree, 2007). We predicted that activations beyond these
regions, and fundamentally in contrast with other sentence
conditions, could be taken for operations that were not restricted
to linguistic-semantic processing, but also involving pragmatic
processes of indeterminacy resolution.We predicted in particular
activations to involve temporal and frontal regions bilaterally,
which would be more consistent with patterns of activation
obtained in studies involving pragmatic processes of non-literal
sentence interpretation and discourse processing. Crucial to our
hypotheses are also the contrasts with the following other five
conditions.
Preferred
Preferred sentences represent the canonical form. They are
employed as the standard control condition for indeterminate
sentences, and have been shown to be processed more easily than
indeterminate sentences (e.g., McElree et al., 2001; Traxler et al.,
2002)—a result which we have replicated above with both offline
and online response measures. Consistent with our pragmatic-
inferential hypotheses, we predicted that the indeterminate and
preferred sentences would differ especially in terms of pragmatic
resources recruited during sentence processing, with the former
eliciting comparatively greater activation in fronto-temporal
areas bilaterally.
Pragmatically anomalous
Our acceptability judgments showed that what we called
pragmatically anomalous sentences are regarded as infelicitous
compared to preferred and indeterminate sentences. However,
although they engendered numerically longer RTs relative
to indeterminate sentences (MD = 12 ms), this difference
was not statistically significant. We hypothesized that both
sentences require pragmatic inferences to build an acceptable
interpretation, and therefore, indeterminate sentences should
pattern together with pragmatically anomalous sentences.
Non-preferred
Although syntactically well formed, non-preferred sentences
describe activities that are less strongly associated with the agent
in the sentence, and are therefore rated lower than preferred
sentences. Although they are grammatical, their interpretation
requires accessing non-dominant meanings, which makes
them more demanding than preferred sentences (de Almeida,
2004). Therefore, it would be expected for non-preferred
sentences to pattern primarily with preferred sentences but with
attenuated differentiation with indeterminate sentences, as was
demonstrated with our norming data.
Full-VP
Full-VP sentences are both syntactically well formed and
pragmatically felicitous. However, our RT data show that
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they take longer to process than preferred sentences at the
object position and that they are not significantly faster than
indeterminate sentences. Full-VP sentences are structurally and
semantically more complex then preferred sentences, and thus
might require additional computations. These factors may have
increased processing times, even though the sentences were
judged to be felicitous. Accordingly, we predicted that full-VP
sentences would recruit more linguistic resources than preferred
sentences as a function of their complexity—in particular due
to the need to compose the more complex VP. They should
therefore diverge from indeterminate sentences pragmatically:
rather than leaving the nature of the event to be inferred, they
make it explicit.
Syntactically anomalous
These sentences were formed by using non-alternating
intransitive verbs with complements. These sentences
were judged to be the least felicitous and have generated
the longest processing latencies. There are at least two
possibilities for how the parser might deal with such structural
violations: (1) pursue effortful repair processes; or (2) reject
the sentence as ungrammatical without additional effort.
Accordingly, syntactically anomalous sentences may show
increased patterns of activation reflecting post-linguistic
repair processes, or rather, display minimal patterns of
activation reflecting early rejection—at the verb-object—by
the parser. Support for ‘‘early rejection’’ would be obtained
if most sentence types, but particularly indeterminate
and pragmatically anomalous sentences, engage pragmatic
resources more so than syntactically anomalous sentences.
Support for a ‘‘repair’’ hypothesis, thus, would pattern these
sentences with pragmatically anomalous and indeterminate
sentences.
Method
Participants
Eighteen Concordia University students (14 females)
participated in this experiment. They ranged in age from
18 to 38 years (M = 24.2), were native speakers of English,
right-handed, and had normal (20/20 Snellen) vision.
Participants gave informed consent and reported having no
history of cognitive impairment or brain injury. They were
compensated $60 for the session, which lasted approximately
90 min.
Materials
We employed the 648 sentences developed in our norming study,
with the same distribution of materials into six lists, and the same
fillers and questions.
Measures and apparatus
A 3 Tesla Whole Body MR System (MAGNETOM Trio, Siemens
Medical Systems, and Erlangen, Germany) was used for image
acquisition. Before the fMRI run, 160 3D FLASH structural
images were acquired in slices of 1.2 mm thickness in the sagittal
plane (256 mm × 256 mm) yielding a spatial resolution of
1 mm × 1 mm × 1.2 mm for the anatomical volume. Time
to repetition (TR) for the anatomical scan was 2300 ms and
time to echo (TE) was 2.99 ms. The whole brain fMRI scan
employed an echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence measuring
the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal. A total
of 31 functional slices per volume were acquired for each
subject, in each run. These slices, which were acquired in the
transversal plane, interleaved and, in ascending order, were
3 mm thick, at an inplane resolution of 3 mm × 3 mm
(matrix size 64 × 64) and in a field of view (FOV) of
192 mm × 192 mm, with a 0.75 mm gap between them in order
to avoid cross talking. The spatial resolution of functional images
was 3 mm × 3 mm × 3.75 mm. A complete scan of the whole
brain was acquired in 2000 ms (TR); the flip angle was 75◦,
TE = 30 ms, and a total number of 550 volumes were acquired
during one functional run. Each subject participated in two
functional runs, for which we used the online automatic motion
correction sequence, implemented prospective and retrospective
by the scanner (MOCO series).
Procedure
Sentences were presented visually on a projector placed at
the head of the fMRI tunnel, which could be observed by
the participants through a mirror placed on the head coil.
A computer running E-prime (Schneider et al., 2002) was
used for the presentation of stimuli and collection of Yes/No
responses. Sentences were presented word-by-word in black
text centered on a gray background. Each word was presented
for 500 ms with an interstimulus interval (ISI) of 100 ms
between words. Prior to each sentence, a fixation cross (+)
was presented in the center of the screen for 6000 ms (see
Figure 1). Responses to the filler questions were registered on a
button box with buttons corresponding to the index finger and
the middle finger for the Yes and No responses, respectively.
Trials were divided into two randomized blocks. These blocks
corresponded to two functional scans, each lasting approximately
18 min with a short break between them. This was followed
by a 9-min structural scan. Prior to the scanning session, the
participants were provided with practice trials on a laptop
computer and were familiarized with fMRI scanning using a
simulator.
Preprocessing of fMRI data
BrainVoyager QX (Brain Innovation B.V., Maastricht,
Netherlands) software was used for fMRI data preprocessing
and analysis. The functional bi-dimensional images of every
subject were preprocessed to correct for the difference in time
slice acquisition (slice scan time correction). In addition to
linear detrending, a high-pass filter of three cycles per time
course (frequency domain) was applied to the corrected 2D
slices. The functional series was then preprocessed to correct
for possible motion artifacts in any plane of the tridimensional
space and to ensure that movements in any plane did not
exceed 3 mm. The motion correction was performed in
BrainVoyager by an algorithm which aligns the subsequent
functional volumes to the first one. Then, the six movement
parameters (three translations, three rotations) are displayed
graphically, thus allowing us to verify the magnitude of
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FIGURE 1 | Time course of stimuli presentation employed in the
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment. Each word
was presented for 500 ms with an interstimulus interval (ISI; blank screen) of
100 ms. The total intertrial interval (fixation point, “+”) was 6000 ms. The main
data analyses took into account blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD)
signal change from “pre-verb” event (3000 ms of fixation point plus The
professor) to “post-verb” event (which included the verb and complement,
began the paper, plus 3000 ms of fixation point).
the movement during the scanning session. In our case, no
subject moved their head more than 3 mm or 3◦ along or
around any of the three spatial axes. As for co-registration and
spatial normalization, we employed the standard procedure
in BrainVoyager. To this end, the functional volume was first
spatially aligned with the raw anatomical volume in two steps:
(1) an initial alignment based on the information stored in
the header of the DICOM file about the position of the slices
relative to the center of the scanner; and (2) a fine tuning or
rigid body alignment which was done manually by controlling
the translation and rotation of the functional volume relative
to the anatomical one (see Goebel et al., 2006). Later, these
functional images were used to reconstruct the 3D functional
volume for every subject and every run. The 3D functional
volume was aligned with the corresponding 3D anatomical
volume, and both were normalized to standard Talairach space
(Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) and to an isovoxel resolution
of 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm. Spatial smoothing using a Gaussian
kernel at 8 mm full width at half maximum (FWHM) was
applied to the 3D functional data.
Statistical analyses of fMRI data
We used a rapid event-related block design to analyze our data.
The time-course of each trial was separated in two periods,
pre-verb and post-verb (Figure 1). The latter 3000 ms of
the fixation presentation and the subject NP in the sentence
comprised the pre-verb event (e.g., 3000 ms of ‘‘+’’ and ‘‘The
professor’’). The verb and its NP complement, as well as the
first 3000 ms of the next fixation presentation comprised
the post-verb event (e.g., ‘‘began the paper’’ and 3000 ms
of ‘‘+’’). These pre-verb and post-verb intervals were then
convolved with the two Gamma HRF’s (onset of response = 5 s,
undershoot = 16 s, dispersion = 1 s, response to undershot
ratio = 6) as implemented by default in BrainVoyager. For each
sentence type, a pre-verb and post-verb predictor was included
as fixed-factors in a single subject General Linear Model (GLM).
The parameters of this GLM model were subsequently entered
into a second random-effect GLMmodel used for group analysis
(Penny and Holmes, 2003). The rationale behind this contrast
method was to isolate processes underlying the combination of a
verb and its complement as well as post-linguistic processes that
might be triggered by the sentence. In a first analysis, activation
maps for the entire brain were computed voxelwise at the group
level for the contrast measuring the difference in BOLD signal
change from the pre-verb to the post-verb level of activation
for each of the six sentence types. The criteria used to display
the activation maps for the post-verb > pre-verb contrasts were:
(a) a statistical threshold of at least p < 0.001 at the voxel level,
which also corresponded to a false discovery rate correction of
q(FDR) < 0.05; and (b) a cluster size of at least 108 adjacent
significant voxels (108 mm3). In addition, for each sentence
type we computed a laterality index reflecting the proportion of
the difference between RH and LH voxels activated significantly
above the threshold, relative to the sum of both RH and LH
voxels using the formula ((#right − #left)/(#right + #left)). We
predicted that a lateralization index for each of the sentence types
would help us understand the resources engaged in processing
the range of syntactic and semantic conditions we employed and
thus contribute to a broader picture of the neuronal correlates of
sentence processing.
In order to identify the neuronal substrates engaged
specifically in processing indeterminate sentences in contrast
with other sentence types, we employed a second analysis with
the following procedure: (a) the areas identified in the first
analysis for the indeterminate sentence type were defined as
regions of interest (ROIs); and (b) in each of these ROIs we
assessed the number of voxels for which the difference between
predictors (post-verb> pre-verb) was significantly higher for the
indeterminate than for other sentence types; for this analysis we
employed the same statistical threshold (p < 0.001). This second
analysis allowed us to obtain a map of neurological resources
employed in the interpretation of indeterminate sentences
throughout the brain, while simultaneously investigating the
engagement of these areas in the interpretation of other sentence
types with regards to the post-verb> pre-verb contrast.
Results and Discussion
The contrast of interest (post vs. pre-verb) indicates that each
sentence type activates a large network of clusters in both
hemispheres (for the full set of significantly activated regions
per condition, see Table 4). In addition to the more traditional
‘‘language areas’’ (i.e., Broca’s and Wernicke’s), we observe that
several regions emerge systematically across sentence types, such
as the medial prefrontal cortex (e.g., ACC), and regions in the
superior parietal lobule and temporal lobe, bilaterally.
In Figure 2, we present the volume of activation for left
and right hemispheres surpassing the statistical (p < 0.001) and
spatial (108 mm3 contiguous voxels) thresholds, as well as the
values of the laterality index. This index reveals that, with the
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TABLE 4 | Activated regions for all sentence conditions.
Left hemisphere Talairach Volume Maximum Right hemisphere Talairach Volume Maximum
regions coordinates (mm3) t(17) regions coordinates (mm3) t(17)
Preferred Preferred
Insula −31 22 2 167 4.59 Fusiform gyrus (BA 37) 40 −51 −15 479 4.90
Postcentral gyrus (BA 40) −29 −35 54 119 4.32 Lingual gyrus (BA 17) 20 −94 −10 213 4.62
Precentral gyrus (BA 6) −44 −6 47 569 4.92 Medial frontal gyrus (BA 6) 1 0 50 2033 5.03
Sub-gyral (BA 20) −38 −16 −18 162 4.83 Middle occipital gyrus (BA 19) 45 −75 −6 460 4.86
Thalamus (Medial −7 −17 8 2071 5.43 Thalamus 13 −17 12 194 4.80
Dorsal Nucleus)
Non-preferred Non-preferred
Claustrum −29 16 5 325 4.61 Insula (BA 13) 33 17 6 537 5.13
Inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) −53 −43 24 1193 5.23 Middle occipital gyrus (BA 19) 46 −76 −6 1073 6.34
Medial frontal gyrus (BA 6) −5 −4 54 179 4.50 Superior frontal gyrus (BA 46) 4 12 55 150 4.87
Middle frontal gyrus (BA 46) −43 15 23 3060 5.59 Superior parietal lobule (BA 7) 30 −55 43 205 4.58
Full-VP Full-VP
Cingulate gyrus (BA 32) −13 17 23 2311 7.31 Cingulate gyrus (BA 24) 11 12 31 2250 8.07
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) −39 21 14 1143 5.07 Cingulate gyrus (BA 24) 20 −12 42 231 5.36
Inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) −38 −36 40 492 4.80 Claustrum 26 24 5 245 5.11
Middle temporal gyrus (BA 39) −48 −57 10 265 4.78 Claustrum 31 13 0 253 4.90
Precentral gyrus (BA 4) −18 −21 54 534 5.22 Lentiform nucleus 11 3 3 922 5.47
(Lat. Globus Pallidus)
Precentral gyrus (BA 6) −38 −13 61 128 4.53 Lingual gyrus (BA 17) 17 −89 −4 258 4.59
Superior frontal gyrus (BA 6) −1 5 63 2707 6.34 Middle frontal gyrus (BA 6) 37 −5 50 142 4.57
Thalamus (Medial −5 −12 10 1963 5.52 Superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) 54 −29 3 117 4.98
Dorsal Nucleus) Supramarginal gyrus (BA 40) 34 −42 30 375 5.32
Indeterminate Indeterminate
Fusiform gyrus (BA 19) −26 −77 −11 748 6.01 Fusiform gyrus (BA 37) 42 −50 −10 115 4.42
Inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) −36 −36 38 171 4.57 Insula (BA 13) 35 14 7 1467 5.46
Insula (BA 13) −34 14 8 845 4.90 Superior parietal lobule (BA 7) 31 −54 40 856 4.62
Middle temporal gyrus (BA 22) −53 −36 7 5396 7.25 Superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) 48 −23 1 700 4.97
Middle temporal gyrus (BA 39) −53 −71 11 150 5.03 Medial frontal gyrus (BA 6/BA 32) 0 12 42 1584 5.97
Posterior cingulate (BA 23) −1 −31 23 170 4.97 Thalamus (Medial Dorsal Nucleus) 9 −19 9 897 5.44
Precentral gyrus (BA 44) −49 5 9 431 5.04
Precentral gyrus (BA 6) −50 −2 30 120 4.75
Superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) −31 57 24 564 5.14
Superior parietal lobule (BA 7) −23 −67 41 367 4.74
Superior temporal gyrus (BA 38) −54 7 −7 512 6.14
Thalamus −9 −21 2 4288 7.08
Syntactically anomalous Syntactically anomalous
Insula (BA 13) −35 16 12 3214 6.61 Fusiform gyrus (BA 37) 42 −52 −16 739 7.63
Middle occipital gyrus (BA 18) −28 −79 −10 126 4.33 Inferior occipital gyrus (BA 19) 45 −73 −5 568 5.51
Superior temporal gyrus (BA 21) −52 −17 −3 235 4.97 Insula (BA 13) 31 18 11 592 5.16
Thalamus (Medial Dorsal Nucleus) −8 −14 8 143 4.56 Precuneus (BA 7) 22 −56 34 1088 5.88
Thalamus (Ventral Lateral Nucleus) 10 −9 8 886 5.33
Pragmatically anomalous Pragmatically anomalous
Insula (BA 13) −35 14 12 381 4.77 Angular gyrus (BA 39) 32 −61 33 159 4.82
Superior frontal gyrus (BA 6) −1 21 61 403 5.52 Insula (BA 13) 34 16 11 1208 6.09
Thalamus −7 −30 −2 142 4.29 Medial frontal gyrus (BA 32) 3 7 43 4818 6.99
Middle occipital gyrus (BA 19) 49 −75 −8 168 4.54
exception of the pragmatically anomalous sentence type, which
had a positive value indicating more RH than LH activation,
all others had negative values, showing a predominance of
LH over RH activation. In addition, indeterminate sentences
showed a higher volume of activation in the RH compared to
all other conditions with the exception of the full-VP sentences.
Indeterminate sentences also showed a greater spread of
activation in the LH—and in fact across the whole brain—relative
to all other sentence types.
The general picture that emerges from this descriptive
analysis is consistent with previous findings vis-à-vis the
lateralization of linguistic and non-linguistic resources
involved in sentence interpretation. In addition, these findings
suggest that indeterminate sentences recruit computational
resources that surpass those involved in the interpretation
of both canonical and anomalous constructions, with both
linguistic and non-linguistic processes contributing to
interpretation. The novelty of our (post-verb > pre-verb)
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FIGURE 2 | Volume of activation (1 voxel = 1 mm3) surpassing the
statistical (t(17) > 3.97, p < 0.001) and spatial threshold (minimum
108 contiguous voxels in a cluster) for the contrast postverb > preverb
for each sentence type in the fMRI experiment. The laterality index,
expressed as the ratio of the difference between the number of voxels
activated on the right vs. on the left relative to the total number of voxels, is
displayed above each bar. Negative values indicate propotionately greater
voxels on the left, whereas positive indicates proportionately greater voxels
activated on the right hemisphere (RH).
approach is that it isolates verb-object noun composition as
the source of neuronal activity for each sentence type. This
method specifically addresses how the different verb-noun
combinations affect interpretive processes, permitting us
to isolate neurological structures associated uniquely with
indeterminacy.
Figure 3 displays two overlapping activation maps, one
showing the significant regions of activation for indeterminate
sentences (all t’s > 3.97, all p’s < 0.001) and the other showing
the specific voxels for which indeterminate sentences elicited
significantly greater activation than the contrasting sentence
types (all t’s > 3.97, all p’s < 0.001). Based on the network
activated by the contrast post-verb > pre-verb for indeterminate
sentences in the whole brain, we selected five ROIs as being
particularly informative for demarcating the resources recruited
specifically for indeterminate sentence comprehension relative to
the other sentence types. These regions were the STG and the
IFG bilaterally, as well as the ACC (Table S1 in Supplementary
Material shows all contrasts).
In the R-STG, indeterminate sentences yielded statistically
higher activation than preferred, syntactically anomalous
and pragmatically anomalous sentence types. However,
indeterminate sentences did not yield higher activation
relative to the non-preferred and full-VP sentences.
More specifically, from a total volume of 700 voxels that
surpassed the statistical threshold in the R-STG, there
were 74 voxels that were significantly more activated for
indeterminate sentences compared to preferred sentences
(average t-value for this difference: t(17) = 4.13, p < 0.001)
and 97 voxels that were significantly more activated for
indeterminate sentences compared to pragmatically anomalous
sentences (average t-value for this difference: t(17) = 4.13,
p< 0.001).
In the R-IFG, indeterminate sentences also yielded
statistically higher activation than preferred in 128 voxels
(average t-value: t(17) = 3.99, p < 0.001). No other comparisons
at this ROI were significant. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that indeterminate sentences might
engage greater RH resources than preferred sentences, and
also consistent with studies that show R-IFG activation for
metonymic sentences (e.g., Africa is hungry, Rapp et al., 2011),
which arguably require pragmatic processes for recovering
the proper interpretation of the subject noun. However,
indeterminate sentences did not differ from non-preferred
and full-VP sentences, suggesting that as constructions deviate
from the canonical form, they show attenuated margins
of differentiation with the indeterminate condition. In
the ACC, indeterminate sentences elicited greater activity
than preferred (584 voxels, average t-value: t(17) = 4.39,
p < 0.001), syntactically anomalous, and pragmatically
anomalous (946 voxels, average t-values: t(17) = 4.30, p < 0.001)
constructions.
Indeterminate sentences yielded greater activation in L-IFG
(Broca’s area) than syntactically and pragmatically anomalous
conditions, but no differences were found at this ROI between
indeterminate and the three other sentence types—preferred,
non-preferred and full-VP. One possible interpretation of these
results is that the two anomalous conditions engage less so
the L-IFG because they require different forms of repair. In
the case of the syntactically anomalous condition, it is possible
that an early rejection of its ungrammatical verb-complement
combination requires little effort from the parser. As for the
pragmatically anomalous condition, the greater involvement
of RH regions, as shown by our laterality indices, might
suggest that repair of these sentences lies beyond Broca’s
area.
A total of 169 voxels in the L-IFG showed more activation
for the contrast post-verb > pre-verb in indeterminate
relative to pragmatically anomalous sentences (average t-values:
t(17) = 4.18, p < 0.001). In the left L-STG (Wernicke’s
area), indeterminate sentences showed significant differences
relative to all sentence types (all p’s < 0.001). These results
complement the findings from the volumetric and laterality
descriptive analyses by showing that processing of indeterminate
sentences relies on both a greater volume and a higher level
of activity in both LH and RH compared to all other sentence
types, including those that are syntactically and pragmatically
anomalous.
Our final analysis focused on the spatial overlap of the
activation maps for indeterminate, preferred and pragmatically
anomalous sentences in the five prefrontal and temporal
ROI (IFG and STG bilaterally and ACC; see Figure 4).
For this analysis we focused on these three sentence types
with different but complementary motivations. First, the
preferred sentence is the most common type of control
sentence employed in all experimental studies on indeterminacy,
including the two neuroimaging studies we reviewed. Second,
the pragmatically anomalous condition would allow us to
see how it patterns with the indeterminate condition, thus
giving us a better understanding of the difference between
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FIGURE 3 | Overlap between two statistical maps. Depicted in orange are the regions significantly activated by the contrast postverb > preverb for the
indeterminate sentences (minimum t(17) = 3.97, p < 0.001, FDR < 0.05). Depicted in blue are the voxels for which the difference in activation postverb > preverb is
significantly greater in indeterminate compared to each of the other sentence types. The overlap between the two statistical maps (in purple) corresponds to the
voxels that are specific to the processing of the composition between verb and complement in the indeterminate vs. each of the other sentence types. X values
indicate coordinates in Talairach space: (A) right temporal lobe; (B) right lateral prefrontal cortex; (C) medial prefrontal lobe; (D) left lateral prefrontal cortex; (E) left
temporal lobe. For a high-resolution version of this figure, see Supplementary Material.
pragmatic anomaly and indeterminacy, in the ROI. A spatial
intersection of the three sentence types was observed in
the ACC. However, in the L-IFG, the statistical maps
of indeterminate and pragmatically anomalous sentences
were spatially distinct from that of preferred sentences
although they overlapped with each other. Moreover, in
the R-IFG the activation map for preferred sentences did
not surpass the statistical threshold, whereas there was an
overlap between pragmatically anomalous and indeterminate
sentence types, which surpassed the threshold. Finally, in
the temporal lobes, we observed an overlap of indeterminate
and preferred statistical maps in the STG but, surprisingly,
no significant activation for pragmatically anomalous
sentences.
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FIGURE 4 | The overlap and spatial differences between activation maps (changes in BOLD signal) for the three main sentence conditions, preferred
(green clusters), indeterminate (orange clusters), and pragmatically anomalous (blue clusters) in five regions-of-interest. Left STG and IFG are shown in
top row; the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), in the middle; and right STG and IFG in the bottom row. In the left and right STG we observe a greater activation for
indeterminate sentences, with no overlap with the other sentence types; however, in the IFG, both on the right and left there is overlapping with preferred sentences.
In the left IFG (top right) there is greater activation for indeterminate (BA 44) but overlapping with pragmatically anomalous (see insert); a ventral region of BA
44 shows greater sensitivity for preferred sentences. In ACC we observe overlapping activations, with indeterminate sentences activating a more anterior area, while
preferred and pragmatically anomalous sentences activate more the posterior parts of ACC; all activated regions in the ACC are more right-lateralized. In the right
STG we observe significant activation for indeterminate sentences only, and in the right IFG we note common and distinct activations for both pragmatically
anomalous and indeterminate sentences but not preferred. X and Y values indicate coordinates in Talairach space. ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; IFG, inferior frontal
gyrus; STG, superior temporal gyrus.
This pattern of activation suggests that indeterminate
sentences share properties of both canonical and pragmatically
anomalous sentences. On the one hand, indeterminate
and preferred constructions mutually activate the STG
bilaterally, suggesting that the two sentence types may
undergo a qualitatively similar semantic analysis, consistent
with studies showing bilateral STG activation for canonical
sentences (e.g., Friederici et al., 2003). On the other
hand, indeterminate sentence activation diverged from
that of preferred sentences and instead patterned with
pragmatically anomalous sentences in the R-IFG, suggesting
that beyond semantic analysis, indeterminate sentences
may be pragmatically distinct from canonical sentence
types.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study provides new evidence for the neurological
underpinnings of the process of indeterminate sentence
interpretation. We found that indeterminate sentences
engage a wide network involving left, right, and medial-
frontal regions of the brain. More specifically, compared
to preferred sentences, indeterminate sentences required
greater involvement of R-IFG (BAs 44, 45), bilaterally the
STG (primarily BA 22) as well as the ACC (BAs 24, 32). In
addition, our results also show that indeterminate sentences
patterned with our pragmatically anomalous sentences (The
author drank the book), but elicited greater hemodynamic
changes in all ROI. Finally, our laterality indices show
greater involvement of LH regions for all sentence types,
except for the pragmatically anomalous condition. However,
indeterminate sentences elicited greater activation in RH
regions relative to all control sentences, except the full-VP
condition.
Overall, what emerges from our study is that indeterminate
sentences engage more areas than control sentences (see Table 4)
and do so with greater intensity at all ROIs (Figure 4). More
importantly, we show that indeterminate sentences engage areas
consistent with a pragmatic view of indeterminate sentence
resolution. In the following section, we discuss our fMRI findings
in relation to several of our hypotheses and contrast them with
the cognitive neuroscience literature on coercion effects.
Coercion or Pragmatic Processes?
The primary goal of our study was to obtain a general activation
map for indeterminate sentences. Given the inconsistent results
found in other studies (Pylkkänen and McElree, 2007; Husband
et al., 2011), we wanted to establish which neuroanatomical
resources are deployed in the resolution of indeterminacy. But
in contrast with these other studies, which were devised to find
the neuroanatomical source of coercion, we were also interested
in contrasting two hypotheses on how indeterminacy might be
resolved (or attempted to be resolved)—whether by semantic
processes of coercion said to be localized primarily at the
vmPFC or at the L-IFG, or whether by a wider network thus
characterizing pragmatic processes.
Overall, our results show that indeterminate sentences recruit
a vast network involving both temporal and frontal regions
bilaterally. Although indeterminate sentences—consistent with
linguistic processes—are clearly left-lateralized, the alleged
mismatch between verb and NP complement in cases such as
The author started the book recruits more RH resources than
do preferred sentences (. . .wrote the book). In addition, our
results also show that the activation maxima for indeterminate
sentences occur in a more dorsal area of the L-IFG compared
to preferred sentences, suggesting potential differences in the
syntactic properties of these sentences (see, e.g., de Almeida
and Dwivedi, 2008). Interestingly, Husband et al. (2011) also
found significant involvement of the L-IFG for indeterminate
sentences, thus, indeed this region appears to play a critical
role in indeterminate sentence processing. In contrast with
our position, however, Husband et al. (2011) proposed that
the difference between indeterminate and preferred sentences
in the L-IFG reflects the extra compositional mechanisms
required by coercion. They suggest that the L-IFG works
in the detection of the mismatch between verb and noun
complement and also that it ‘‘may function to select and
retrieve the noun’s event-related meaning’’ (p. 3262). Although
we cannot rule out this interpretation, it is also possible
that this difference instead reflects the syntactic complexity
of indeterminate sentences. As we have proposed elsewhere
(see de Almeida and Dwivedi, 2008; de Almeida and Riven,
2012), indeterminate VPs may include a structural gap which
triggers the enrichment process and may, therefore, elicit
unique activations in the L-IFG. It is also our suggestion
that this gap might be the source of ‘‘coercion effects’’,
namely the RT differences between indeterminate and control
sentences found in some behavioral studies (de Almeida and
Dwivedi, 2008). Whether or not the L-IFG activation reflects
coercion or syntactic complexity will ultimately be settled by
neuroimaging experiments designed specifically to contrast these
positions.
While Husband et al.’s (2011) fMRI results—which focused
on activation in the L-IFG—challenged the MEG localization
data (Pylkkänen and McElree, 2007), our results, obtained on
the basis of an initial whole brain analysis, have corroborated
in part those MEG findings. In fact, we propose that our spatial
data complement those temporally sensitive MEG findings
and converge with regards to the nature of indeterminate
sentence processing. In particular, the MEG study showed
that indeterminate sentences produced a bilateral temporal
activation, followed by activation that was source-localized at
ventromedial frontal areas (Pylkkänen and McElree, 2007).
Similarly, we found bilateral STG activation with corresponding
bilateral activation in the IFG and medial activation in the
ACC. Thus, collectively these findings suggest that indeed
indeterminate sentences engage a neural network of left,
right, and medial regions, with activation unfolding first in
the LH, then the RH, and finally in medial regions of the
network.
If indeed each of these regions participates in the resolution
process, this challenges a view of indeterminacy that links the
resolution uniquely to the L-IFG as Husband et al. (2011)
proposed. Consequently, this casts doubt on a version of coercion
theory which attributes the resolution of these sentences strictly
to a semantic coercion operation. Instead, these empirical
observations corroborate a pragmatic theory of indeterminacy
resolution. Consistent with data from other studies involving
canonical as well as anomalous constructions (for reviews see
Lau et al., 2008; Friederici, 2011), we propose that indeterminate
sentence processing appears to initially undergo a linguistic,
denotational analysis, which then triggers pragmatic resolution
processes (a search for an intended message). Interestingly, it
appears that other forms of coercion also undergo a pragmatic
resolution after an initial literal interpretation. In a MEG
study investigating aspectual coercion (Throughout the day
the student sneezed. . .). Brennan and Pylkkänen (2008) found
that the mismatch between a punctual event (sneeze) and a
durative context (throughout the day), elicits a RH activation
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about 340 ms after the verb. This RH activation is followed
by an AMF at around 450 ms. This two-stage model of
the aspectual mismatch resolution is preceded by an initial
semantic composition that is only later deemed anomalous, thus
requiring pragmatic repair—so that sneeze can be interpreted
iteratively.
Although our study was not designed specifically to replicate
Pylkkänen and McElree’s (2007) MEG findings—and in fact
we adopt a different theoretical perspective—both their MEG
and the present fMRI results point in a similar direction
with regards to the neuroanatomic signature of indeterminate
sentence interpretation: activation spreads from left to right
to medial regions of the brain. The only exception to the
convergence between these two studies is that we found medial
activation in the ACC as opposed to the vmPFC. A possible
explanation for this disparity may be that the ACC is the
anatomical source of the AMF effect reported by Pylkkänen
and McElree (2007). Because the ACC is anatomically (and, by
hypothesis, functionally) connected to the vmPFC (Margulies
et al., 2007) it is possible that the MEG effects reflect the
spread of activation from ACC into pre-frontal areas. As has
been shown in several studies, the cingulate cortex is involved
not only in managing conflict resolution, but also in language
comprehension tasks such as judgment of discourse coherence
(Virtue et al., 2006), detection of semantic/pragmatic anomaly
(e.g., Ni et al., 2000), drawing inferences from text (Ferstl et al.,
2008) and the interpretation of non-literal expressions such
as metaphors (e.g., Bottini et al., 1994; Bambini et al., 2011).
Thus, the ACC appears to be involved in diverse types of
pragmatic-level computations, above and beyond the processing
of determinate sentences. Given the comparably better spatial
resolution of fMRI overMEG, and the fact that vmPFC activation
was not found in ours or Husband et al.’s (2011) fMRI studies, we
suggest that Pylkkänen and McElree’s (2007) medial activation
likely reflects ACC processes.
In summary, the present fMRI results point to a
neuroanatomical source of coercion effects compatible with
a pragmatic view of indeterminate sentence interpretation
(e.g., de Almeida, 2004; de Almeida and Dwivedi, 2008).
The widespread activations found for indeterminate sentences
suggest that many sources of information might be required
to attempt to resolve indeterminacy arising from potential
verb-complement mismatches. Our data are in conflict with
Husband et al. (2011) for whom ‘‘the mismatch and its repair
only affect semantic composition and do not recruit other
processes for repair or rejection’’ (p. 3262). In fact, we show
that many other resources are recruited to resolve sentence
indeterminacy. More in line with our view are results from
two ERP studies which, nonetheless, take a different theoretical
approach. Kuperberg et al. (2010) propose that coercion
effects might be due to ‘‘implicit attempts to retrieve relevant
information from semantic memory to ‘fill-in’ such mismatches’’
(p. 2698). Further, Baggio et al. (2010) propose a ‘‘unification’’
approach according to which a verb’s semantic-structural
representation calls for an event complement while discourse
provides a filler event. These ideas are in fact compatible with
the pragmatic model we support—including the suggestion by
de Almeida and Dwivedi (2008) that if there is a processing
difference between indeterminate and control sentences it might
be due to inferential processes called for by a structural VP
gap inherent in indeterminate constructions. Although the
present study did not aim to investigate specifically the VP
gap in indeterminate sentences, their greater—but spatially
distinct—activation of L-IFG compared to control sentences
suggests the possibility that if there is a gap it might be
responsible for triggering pragmatic processes that enrich the
initial representation of the sentence.
It is important to note that pragmatic enrichment triggered
by a syntactic gap (. . .begin [vp-gap] the book) differs from
semantic interpolation (. . .begin [to write] the book). The latter
assumes that the enriched semantic composition is parasitic on a
suitable event to resolve the hypothetical verb-object mismatch
of indeterminate sentences. In contrast, pragmatic enrichment
triggered by a VP gap occurs beyond semantic composition
and is characterized by searching—possibly abductively—for the
intended meaning of an indeterminate expression. Moreover, a
gap thus conceived is not a ‘‘silent verb’’ (Pylkkänen, 2008) but
simply a syntactically determined position; as such, it works as a
trigger for inferences, not for actual verb fillers.
The Neurological Underpinnings of
Semantic and Pragmatic Processes
If coercion effects are indeed pragmatic effects reflecting attempts
to resolve indeterminacy, as we suggest, we are left with a
view of semantic composition that contrasts with the enriched
form of compositionality as proposed by Pustejovsky (1995)
and others (see also Jackendoff, 1997; Traxler et al., 2005).
Semantic composition might be a process that relies primarily
on lexical denotations and syntactic computations—possibly
served by left temporal and frontal structures, as suggested by
neuroimaging and brain recording studies (e.g., Vandenberghe
et al., 2002; Lau et al., 2008; Makuuchi et al., 2009;
Friederici, 2011), with extra computational pragmatic resources
being tapped depending on the degree of specificity of the
resulting verb-internal composition. Thus conceived pragmatic
computations are not constitutive of sentence meaning but
a consequence of sentence indeterminacy. According to this
perspective, indeterminate sentences are fully compositional: a
sentence such as The author started the book is true or false if
the author started doing something, regardless of what the author
started doing.
Thus far, no studies have provided conclusive evidence for
coercion per se, but have rather shown that indeterminate
sentences yield a processing cost. Moreover, there is no evidence
that processing costs reflect linguistic analyses culminating in
an enriched form of semantic composition. While processing
costs can be accounted for by diverse theoretical approaches (see
de Almeida and Dwivedi, 2008; Baggio et al., 2010; de Swart,
2011; Dölling, 2014), we have rather suggested that they might
be a manifestation of widespread activations compatible with
a pragmatic account of indeterminacy resolution. The volume
of activation surpassing our statistical and spatial thresholds
in both hemispheres obtained for indeterminate sentences may
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indicate that indeterminacy resolution is not bound by linguistic
computations. Rather, it may be that the involvement of left,
right and medial cortical structures reflect a conflict between
diverse sources of information—occurring beyond linguistic
composition—as to what type of event The author started the
book refers to.
A standing issue with regards to the semantics-pragmatics
interface is the division of labor between computations that
are linguistic, mandatory and those that are subject to
extra-linguistic contextual factors. Coercion theory assumes
that an alleged verb-noun mismatch requires extra semantic
computations. The view we articulate—which is in fact
compatible with that of others (e.g., Egg, 2005; Dölling, 2014)—is
that the resolution of indeterminacy is a pragmatic, extra-
linguistic process. Akin to the process of interpreting ametaphor,
an indeterminate sentencemight trigger pragmatic computations
as an attempt to calculate what is intended by the speaker
(Grice, 1989). Our indeterminate sentences patterned with
pragmatic-violated sentences—engaging left, right, and medial
regions—showing that indeed their interpretative processes
overlap substantively with sentences that demand a pragmatic
resolution.
However, despite their analogs patterning overall, critical
differences emerged in the activation of these two sentence types,
with indeterminate sentences activating a much broader cortical
network. This greater activation suggests that neurological
resources involved in sentence interpretation are sensitive to
differences between these sentence types. A sentence such as
The author drank the book, violates our common understanding
of what the verb to drink means and the type of complement
it may take (selectional restrictions), but it carries no true
indeterminacy. In principle, we know what the subject (The
author) did with the object (the book)—namely, drank it. A
plausible way of interpreting this sentence would be by rejecting
a literal, fully compositional meaning and understanding it as a
metaphor (consider, for instance, an author seeking to quench
her thirst for knowledge). An indeterminate sentence, however,
does not call for the rejection of a literal interpretation but rather
builds upon it. Although also fully compositional, determining
what The author actually started doing with the book might call
for an event that is obtained only by appealing to abduction,
thus not by mandatory semantic processes. The greater whole-
brain activation found for indeterminate sentences might reflect
the greater state of uncertainty as to what these sentences
convey.
Finally, two other contrasts are informative with regards
to sentence processing mechanisms more generally. First,
our syntactically and pragmatically anomalous sentences
showed dissociative patterns of activation as indicated by the
laterality index. Whereas pragmatically anomalous sentences
showed greater RH than LH activation, syntactically anomalous
sentences showed the reverse pattern. In addition, when
compared to one another, the absolute volume of activation
was greater in the LH for syntactically anomalous sentences
and greater in the RH for pragmatically anomalous sentences.
These differences in activation might reflect possibly different
interpretation strategies that are triggered when the parser
encounters syntactic vs. pragmatic violations. Specifically, the
diminished activation in the RH for syntactically anomalous
relative to pragmatically anomalous as well as indeterminate
sentences, suggests the possibility that syntactic violations are
rejected by the syntactic parser, whereas the other sentence
types trigger more effortful repair processes. Second, perhaps
the most unexpected result of our experiment was the spread of
activation for full-VP sentences in the RH. In principle, full-VP
sentences leave little open for further pragmatic interpretation,
and accordingly we predicted that they would pattern with
preferred sentences rather than indeterminate sentences in the
RH. However, the opposite trend was observed. Notably, the
post-verb > pre-verb contrast method we employed sets full-VP
sentences apart from the other conditions specifically in terms
of their semantic-compositional complexity. The combination
between aspectual and event verbs in full-VP sentences may
trigger other computations at the linguistic-cognitive interface.
For instance, evidentiality (the information on the evidence
for the proposition expressed), aspect (whether an event has
marked point in time) and tense, interact in ways that are yet to
be determined. Full-VP sentences together with indeterminate
sentences, involve the imperfective aspect—i.e, they express an
event that has no specific end point (started, started writing)—in
contrast with our other, perfective sentence types (wrote, read,
yawned, drank), which may call for different compositional
and interpretive processes. There is also the possibility that
full-VP sentences—which, as we mentioned, have greater surface
complexity—can be considered somewhat convoluted, making
a point that can be usually made with indeterminate sentences,
within supporting discourse contexts. In this regard, there is an
account of full-VP sentences that may be compatible with Grice’s
theory: while it is clear that indeterminate sentences might
call for enrichment, which we deem to be inferential, full-VP
sentences may violate a Gricean maxim, ‘‘be perspicuous’’. By
failing to be succinct, these sentences say more than what is
usually necessary to make a point. In other words, it may be the
case that an indeterminate sentence such as The author started
the book suffices to generate in the hearer the right interpretive
inferences—ones that point to what is most commonly done
with books by authors. Conversely, saying The author started
writing the book may go beyond what is necessary to make the
point, given the expectation that what authors usually do when
they start books is write.
Yet another alternative is that full-VP sentences put the
focus on the main event verb—writing—which may call for a
presupposition: that the author had not started the book before.
This may require conceptualizing a background upon which the
presupposition can be anchored. Certainly, our study cannot
dissociate between these alternatives, nor was it designed with
that inmind. But it is clear from our results that full-VP sentences
present linguistic and cognitive challenges that differentiate them
from our other fully determined conditions. It is worth noting
that the largest cluster of voxels activated for this condition was
at the ACC (BA 24), overlapping with a large cluster activated
for indeterminate sentences (BA 6/32; see Table 4), suggesting
that a common challenge may underlie the interpretation of
these sentences. One possibility is that activations at ACC reflect
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attempts at pragmatic resolution, which would be compatible
with several alternative accounts of the full-VP effects laid out
above.
On a final note, a major issue arising from the results of this
study is how to account for the large clusters of LH activation
associated with indeterminate sentences. We have assumed that
the process of indeterminate sentence interpretation is obtained
by pragmatic inferences, and in fact our prediction that RH
and ACC structures would be more engaged in indeterminacy
resolution was largely supported. We assume that the inferences
that are triggered to resolve (or attempt to resolve) indeterminacy
are computations over semantic/conceptual representations.
They do not involve lexical items but their denotations, the
concepts bearing on sentence meaning and beyond. It has been
shown that the left temporal lobe is part of a ‘‘semantic network’’
which involves possibly categorically organized concepts in the
temporal pole and extends posteriorly up to the supramarginal
gyrus. As we discussed above, there is ample evidence for the
role of the temporal poles in semantic processes (e.g., Damasio
et al., 2004) and also evidence that the supramarginal gyrus and
adjacent areas are involved in argument- and thematic-structure
building (roughly, the assignment of roles to arguments of
verbs to indicate who did what to whom; for review see
de Almeida and Manouilidou, 2015). Our largest LH activation
cluster was at the MTG, which is part of this network. This
is compatible with results obtained by Husband et al. (2011).
Given the posterior location of our cluster (BA 22/39) we
postulate that its activation involves the building of the unusual
argument/thematic structure that aspectual verbs such as begin
engender.
Our second largest LH cluster for indeterminate sentences
was at the thalamus. We are only beginning to understand the
role that the thalamus plays in language comprehension and
semantic processing, but there are indications that the thalamus
is engaged in the detection of syntactic and semantic/pragmatic
anomalies (Wahl et al., 2008), in lexical-semantic tasks, and in
workingmemory supporting language comprehension (Crosson,
1999). The cluster of activation in the thalamus during
indeterminate sentence processing was, in fact, the second
largest of all clusters in the present study. Although this
structure was activated to a lesser extent for other conditions,
it seems to play a significant role in relaying different aspects
of interpretation not only to the ‘‘semantic network’’ of the
LH but to other regions, including the RH. Although a priori
we did not expected thalamic effects to play a key role in
the neuronal correlates we were investigating, one possibility
presented by our data is that the thalamus becomes increasingly
engaged in sentence processing when interpretation requires
widespread coordination between diverse levels of linguistic and
nonlinguistic computations.
Conclusions
Overall, our results show that indeterminate sentences engage
neurological substrates that go beyond those required to
interpret determinate sentences—producing a hemodynamic
response that is more compatible with a view that takes
pragmatic inferences to be triggered beyond classical semantic
composition. While nobody denies that inferential-pragmatic
processes might be a consequence of earlier syntactic and
semantic computations, the crux of the matter is what these
syntactic and semantic computations yield. The coercion theory
assumes that much of the process of indeterminate sentence
interpretation should be resolved by earlier, mostly linguistic
processes of type-shifting and semantic interpolation—with
reduced pragmatic activity compared to determinate sentences.
Our view, in contrast, is that the earlier linguistic computations
leave indeterminate sentences unresolved, with a greater role
played by pragmatic computations in search of what is
intended.
Clearly, our data—as those of other neuroimating
studies—cannot distinguish between hypotheses concerning the
nature of indeterminate resolution without an understanding
of the actual computations performed by activated neuronal
tissue. It has proven difficult to reconcile neuroimaging and
psycholinguistic data with linguistic-theoretical constructs
aiming to understand how language representations and
processes are implemented in the brain. In the case of
neuroimaging studies, in particular, it has often been the
case that neuroanatomical correlates of language processing
have been hard to pinpoint due to numerous methodological
variables (see, e.g., Indefrey and Cutler, 2004; Binder et al., 2009;
Fedorenko and Kanwisher, 2009). Knowledge advancement in
this domain naturally requires converging evidence, obtained
through the application of diverse theoretical perspectives and
methodological approaches. To date, however, only two studies
have investigated how the interpretation of sentences such as The
author started the book might be implemented in the brain, and
both have been guided by the same theoretical position—that
indeterminate sentences are resolved by semantic coercion.
The present study provides new data on this phenomenon
showing different neurological correlates, and suggests that,
rather than semantic coercion, pragmatic computations
play a dominant role in the interpretation of indeterminate
sentences.
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